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ABSTRACT 
In their recent analysis of the alleged decay in modern economics, Ben 
Fine and Dimitris Milonakis claim to find its source and origin in the 
‘marginal revolution’ of the 1870s. They argue that this development led 
to ‘methodological individualism’ and the detachment of economics from 
society and history. I contest their account of the marginal revolution and 
of the role of Alfred Marshall among others. They also fail to provide an 
adequate definition of methodological individualism. I suggest that 
neoclassical economics adopted a denuded concept of the social rather 
than removing these factors entirely. No such removal is possible in 
principle. It is also mistaken to depict neoclassical economics as the 
science of prices and the market. In truth, neoclassical economics fails to 
capture the true nature of markets. I consider some sketch an alternative 
explanation of the sickness of modern economics, which focuses on 
institutional developments since the Second World War. 
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Several books recently have addressed the changing face of modern 
economics.1 Some take a cooler empirical approach; others are more 
critical of the outcome.2 Among the critical surveys, the two books by 
Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis (2009, Milonakis and Fine, 2009) stand 
out. These works have been widely acclaimed, and have received both 
the 2009 Isaac Deutscher Memorial Prize and the 2009 Gunnar Myrdal 
Prize awarded by the European Association for Evolutionary Political 
Economy. In this essay I concentrate my remarks on the last two books, 
but I shall make some reference to other contributions.  
The two books by Fine and Milonakis are not meant to be fun to read. 
They lay out in historical fashion the regress of economics in two 
hundred years from a rounded and inclusive science to ‘an arcane 
branch of mathematics’ that fails to deal ‘with real economic problems’ 
(Friedman 1999, p. 137). As Mark Blaug (1997, p. 3) similarly observed: 
‘Modern economics is sick … Economists have converted the subject 
into a sort of social mathematics in which analytical rigour is everything 
and practical relevance is nothing.’ Fine and Milonakis explore where 
things went wrong. It is a depressing story, not simply because of its 
content but also (as the authors acknowledge) because it is likely to be 
                                                 
1 The author is very grateful to Wilfred Dolfsma and anonymous referees 
for comments on an earlier version on this essay. 
2 David Colander’s (2005, 2009) work offers a more empirical and 
dispassionate approach. Tony Lawson (2006) and Fred Lee (2009) 
present mutually contrasting and remarkably different analyses from that 
offered by Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis (2009, Milonakis and Fine, 
2009). 
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ignored by mainstream economists. They are unlikely to be attracted by 
the non-mathematical, social and historical issues that are thematic in 
these volumes. I share these grave concerns about our profession.  
These detailed and widely-researched volumes force us to confront 
these problems. Fine and Milonakis try to diagnose the sickness, and 
consider how the malady may be cured. As they put it: 
mainstream economics is increasingly subject to an esoteric and 
intellectually inextricable technicism that is absolutely intolerant of 
alternatives and only allows them to survive on its margins. Despite 
its considerable and long-standing methodological and theoretical 
fragilities, there is no sign that this situation is liable to change as a 
result of internally or externally generated critique. (Fine and 
Milonakis 2009, p. 165) 
Writing two books of this seriousness and length is no small 
achievement. They try to use the history of ideas to illuminate the wrong 
turnings of the past and to identify the sources of current problems. 
Surely this demonstrates that the history of economic thought is not 
merely a dusty obsession with old texts: it can have a great deal of 
instructive relevance for today. I know that their authors and I share not 
only a concern with the present state of economics but also we are jointly 
preoccupied with the question of the boundaries of economics and the 
other social sciences. In that respect I found much interesting and 
valuable material in these two books (Hodgson 2001).3 
                                                 
3 I wish to thank them for their generous acknowledgement of one of my 
own books in this area (Hodgson 2001). 
 - 4 - 
But despite many strong points I believe that much of the central line of 
reasoning is deficient or wrong. In the following section I outline what I 
understand to be the main features of their long argument. Subsequently 
I shall explain why I think that several key claims are flawed. At later 
stages I shall introduce alternative diagnoses and consider other 
possible remedies. 
1. The central claims 
The first volume (Milonakis and Fine 2009) is a critical history of 
economic thought from Adam Smith to the postwar ‘formalist revolution’ 
in economics. They consider the contracting boundaries of economics as 
a discipline and how it has changed internally. They revere much of both 
classical and Marxian political economy and argue that adverse 
symptoms in the discipline can be traced back to the subsequent 
‘marginalist revolution’ of the 1870s. The second volume (Fine and 
Milonakis 2009) expands this claim by arguing that many adverse 
developments in economics during the twentieth century can be traced 
back to that fateful decade of marginalism’s triumph. Our authors allege 
that: 
The marginalist revolution had taken the social and the historical out 
of the economy in a dual sense, by resorting to methodological 
individualism and by detaching the market/economy from society. 
(Fine and Milonakis 2009, p. 8) 
And similarly: 
the marginalist revolution had the effect of taking the social (and 
historical) out of economics both by focusing on the (asocial) 
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individual and limiting itself to the science of the market. (Fine and 
Milonakis 2009, p. 12) 
There are a number of claimed consequences here. Several other 
passages in these volumes testify to these. According to these authors, 
the ‘marginalist revolution’ supposedly and eventually led to:4 
(a) the adoption of methodological individualism, 
(b) the depiction of the individual as a rational, utility-maximiser, 
(c)  the depiction of the individual as ‘asocial’ and the removal of the 
‘social’ from economics, 
(d) the removal of the historical dimension from economics, 
(e) increasingly deductivist and ahistorical approaches to theory, and 
(f)  a narrower redefinition of economics as the science of prices and 
the market. 
Much of this is immediately questionable. For example, especially in 
the light of claims (c) and (f), how do our authors deal with Lionel 
Robbins’s (1932) apparently different (re)definition of economics as the 
‘science of choice’ and Gary Becker’s (1976, 1981) wider application of 
neoclassical economic analysis to non-market and ‘social’ phenomena 
such as the family? Do these moves undermine the claim of Fine and 
Milonakis that economics has become defined as the science of markets, 
and has abandoned the social? Fine and Milonakis (2009, pp. 8-9) 
                                                 
4 The seven propositions (a) – (g) below are claims that I eExtracted 
from the two volumes. (See for example Milonakis and Fine, ( 2009, pp. 
2, 6, 11-12, 15, 26, 93, 218, 249), and Fine and Milonakis, ( 2009, pp. 8, 
12, 17, 22, 31, 131).  
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answer that in practice these later moves amounted to the treatment of 
‘social’ phenomena as if they were like markets: 
the link between the economic and the social meant for Becker the 
application of the neoclassical technical economic apparatus to the 
social sphere and treating other areas of the social cosmos as if they 
were markets, rather than bringing the social back into economic 
theorising on any other terms. 
This suggests a further important claim made by the authors: 
(g) when marginalist economic analysis was later extended to ‘social’ 
phenomena it was obliged to treat them as if they were markets. 
Let me put my own view. Out of these seven claims, I am in qualified 
agreement with three. I am mostly in accord with (b), (d) and (e). 
Concerning (b) it is indisputable that the assumption of rational, utility 
maximising behaviour came to dominate economics during the twentieth 
century, although I would date its full hegemony much later than the 
1870s (especially considering the prominence of American 
institutionalism in the first half of the twentieth century). But – as we 
would all agree – by the 1970s, to challenge such an assumption was to 
make one virtually unemployable as an economist, even if such strictures 
were relaxed after 1990.5 
I am also broadly in accord with (d) . I have argued (Hodgson 2001). 
that sSeveral developments including marginalism pushed economics in 
an overly-general direction, to the point of detachment with real but 
historically specific phenomena. But I do not believe that it was the 
outcome of marginalism alone. 
                                                 
5 See the discussion of proposition(e) below. 
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Concerning (e) there is no doubt that during the twentieth century the 
subject became much more axiomatic and deductivist. But there are 
challenges to the view that these trends persisted with full force beyond 
1990 (Colander 2005, Colander et al. 2004, Davis 2006). Notably these 
accounts are dismissed by Fine and Milonakis (2009, pp. 167-9). 
Regarding the other four claims ((a), (c), (f) and (g)), I believe that they 
are either too vague or wrong. My worries include the imprecise use of 
the terms ‘methodological individualism’, ‘social’, and ‘the market’, and 
the thesis that after the 1870s economics increasingly defined itself 
(explicitly or implicitly) in ‘market’ terms. 
Correct diagnosis is vital because it can lead to effective remedies. In 
the next section I shall examine the seven claims in the context of the 
history of ideas. Did the ‘marginalist revolution’ lead to the outcomes as 
alleged? The two sections after that will criticise the flawed claims from 
an analytical point of view. We then move on to alternative diagnoses 
and remedies. 
2. The central claims in historical perspective 
Milonakis and Fine see the ‘marginalist revolution’ as the source of the 
woes of economics. Milonakis and Fine (2009, p. 118) wrongly claim that 
the German historical school were ‘in opposition to marginalism’. In fact 
they were among the earliest developers of marginalist doctrine, as 
Alfred Marshall himself acknowledged. Influenced by earlier German 
thinkers, the founder of the historical school Wilhelm Roscher proposed 
a subjective theory of value in 1854 and Karl Knies – a member of the 
historical school who strongly influenced Marshall – put the principle of 
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diminishing marginal utility at the core of the theory of price (Ekelund and 
Hebert 2002, pp. 200-1). 
Given such observations, established researchers within the history of 
economic thought have moved away from the notion that there was a 
pronounced ‘marginalist revolution’ in the 1870s. Careful historians of 
ideas have shown clearly that it was less of a sudden revolution than an 
intermittent process, traceable back to the writings of a variety of 
economists working as early as the 1830s (Howey 1960, Black et al. 
1973, Ekelund and Hebert 2002). Furthermore, its impact was delayed. It 
was left to Marshall to tie the threads together. Prior to 1890, most of the 
published general histories of economic thought failed to mention the 
term ‘marginal utility’. No written account of this supposed ‘marginalist 
revolution’ appeared until well into the twentieth century. No such 
dramatic revolution was noticed by economists who worked in the 1870s 
– it was more a matter of incremental change from the 1830s to the 
1890s and beyond.6 
Partly because Marshall played a major role in the construction of 
marginalism, Fine and Milonakis are keen to depict him as a villain. 
Unfortunately there are several inaccuracies and misleading suggestions 
in their account. 
                                                 
6 According to the JSTOR database, there is no appearance of the terms 
‘marginal revolution’ or ‘marginalist revolution’ in any leading English 
language journal of economics before 1950 (Burns 1950). The term 
probably appeared in some monographs before that date, but I have 
been unable to trace any examples.  
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It gives a false impression to repeat that ‘Marshall’s main adversaries 
were to be found amongst the British Historical School’ (Milonakis and 
Fine 2009, p. 118) or ‘his main protagonists were provided by the British 
Historical School’ (p. 142) unless one also immediately makes it clear 
that among the historical school there were also some of Marshall’s 
closest and acknowledged allies. 
The authors do their best but fail to show that Marshall became a 
general antagonist of the historical school. They (p. 185) note that 
Marshall lauded the historical school only in the past tense in his 
inaugural lecture of 1885, implying that he no longer thought of them as 
worthy. This is a non sequitur. One can do no more than applaud 
contributions that exist in the past. And use of the past tense does not 
itself imply that any links are severed. Their claim that he also criticised 
the historical school’s ‘lack of theory’ is without any direct support from 
Marshall’s own texts. The suggestion that Marshall’s praise for the 
historical school ended in 1885 is contradicted by repeated multiple 
acknowledgements of the methodological, theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the historical school in every edition of his Principles 
from 1890 until Marshall’s death (Hodgson 2005).  
Furthermore, Marshall had a major theoretical dispute with only one 
member of the historical school, namely William Cunningham, 
notwithstanding his policy differences with Herbert Foxwell and others 
over the matter of free trade. After reading Cunningham’s work, few 
would defend his vulgar empiricism that Marshall so ably demolishes. 
Cunningham was a Comtean positivist (at a time when such views were 
fashionable) who believed that if economic theory were possible at all, it 
would somehow emerge from extensive fact-gathering. For Cunningham 
(1887, p. 8): political economy must ‘for the present be content to 
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observe and classify and describe and name as other sciences have 
been’. Such crude atheoretical empiricism is methodologically 
indefensible. It understandably drew Marshall’s fire. 
In their brief and unsatisfactory account of the Marshall-Cunningham 
debate, Marshall’s claim that Cunningham has misinterpreted his views 
is seen by our authors as an attempt to force his views on others and as 
‘the main substantive issue between the two’ (Milonakis and Fine 2009, 
p. 149). Marshall is acknowledged as being ‘generally conciliatory’ but 
‘firmly on the side of allowing for a separate, abstract theory’ (p. 152). 
This fails to get to grips with the issues under dispute. 
The truth is that Marshall did believe – like any sensible scientist – in 
the importance of ‘abstract theory’. But he repeatedly argued against its 
separation from empirical induction or history. In his Principles and 
elsewhere Marshall (1949, pp. 24, 32) argued that: ‘Induction and 
deduction are both needed for scientific thought as the left foot and the 
right foot are both needed for walking’ and ‘the economist must be 
greedy of facts; but the facts by themselves teach us nothing’. In his 
letters and elsewhere, Marshall repeated warned of the dangers not only 
of atheoretical empiricism, but also of treating theory as an end in itself 
(Whitaker 1996, vol. 2, pp. 256, 280, 393). 
In their attempt to convict him as a major villain in their story, Marshall’s 
close and declared affinities with the historical school are mostly ignored 
(Hodgson 2005). And one piece of affirmative evidence in this regard is 
so shocking to the authors’ negative preconceptions of Marshall that it 
has to be presented with an exclamation mark (Milonakis and Fine 2009, 
p. 138), as if to indicate its absurdity. In fact, there are many places 
where Marshall declares his sympathy with the German historical school. 
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Contrary to what Milonakis and Fine (2009, p. 153) declare on the 
Methodenstreit, there is no substantive evidence that the ‘prevailing view 
at the time was that the abstract theorists had won the argument.’ 
Marshall’s continuing allegiance to Gustav Schmoller and other members 
of the historical school is significant evidence to the contrary. As another 
case in point, far from acknowledging an Austrian victory in the 
Methodenstreit, Joseph Schumpeter (1908, pp. 6-7) wrote ‘both sides 
are mostly right … their sole difference lies in their interests in different 
problems.’ Schumpeter then went on to argue for the coexistence of an 
ahistorical, universal and Walrasian ‘pure economics’, alongside the 
more empirical ‘economic history’ and ‘economic sociology’. 
Fine and Milonakis’sThe account of American institutionalism is more 
balanced than their narrative on Marshall. But they give insufficient credit 
to the theoretical aspect of Wesley Mitchell’s contribution on business 
cycles (Mitchell 1927, Friedman 1950). Mitchell did paid more attention 
to fact-gathering than the development of theory, but that does not mean 
he ignored the latter. Inappropriately they use the verdict of the hostile 
neoclassical critic Tjalling Koopmans to establish Mitchell’s empiricism 
(Milonakis and Fine 2009, p. 187). In fact, on close inspection, what 
Koopmans (1947) really meant by his ‘measurement without theory’ jibe 
was measurement without a theory involving individual utility-maximizers 
(Hodgson 2004, p. 319). 
If we are compare Mitchell’s tempered empiricism with the atheoretical 
fact-gathering of Cunningham, then there is a substantive difference, yet 
while Mitchell is criticised for his empiricist sins, Cunningham is 
misleadingly depicted as a heroic David against Marshall’s Goliath. 
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Fine and Milonakis also fail to acknowledge that the American 
institutionalists saw a place in their economics for a version of 
Marshallian marginalism. For example, John Maurice Clark and Wesley 
Mitchell saw Marshallian price theory as necessary for some types of 
economic analysis, while they criticized some of the more extreme or 
‘unrealistic’ assumptions found in the neoclassical tradition, such as 
individual utility maximization, universal diminishing returns, static 
equilibrium, perfect competition or perfect information. Thorstein Veblen 
also rejected rational utility-maximisation. But when Veblen (1892, 1893, 
1905) analysed price levels he acknowledged the effects of supply and 
demand. As Mitchell (1969, vol. 2, p. 685) pointed out, ‘Veblen himself at 
times makes casual, implicit use of orthodox economic theory’. This 
unacknowledged partial accommodation of Marshallian theory by the 
institutionalists might suggest that Marshallian marginalism is not as 
pernicious as Fine and Milonakis claim. 
In placing much of the blame on the so-called ‘marginalist revolution’ of 
the 1870s, relatively less weight is put on later adverse developments in 
economics, such as the strong drift to formalism from the 1950s. From 
significantly different perspectives, both Mark Blaug (1997) and Tony 
Lawson (1997) see inappropriate formalism as the malady, rather than 
marginalism. I would have liked to such much more discussion of Blaug’s 
and Lawson’s arguments, as well as of the claims by David Colander 
(2005) and others that mainstream economics is beginning to abandon 
deductivism and ‘rational economic man’ in favour of more empirically-
grounded approaches. These issues are controversial and unresolved. 
Yet they are central to the project of understanding both the trajectory 
and the malady of contemporary mainstream economics. 
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3. Some central claims dissected – methodological individualism 
and the social 
I shall now analyse claims (a) and (c). I start with our authors’ repeated 
declaration that one of the gravest negative developments in economics 
is the adoption of methodological individualism. They never provide a 
clear and satisfactory definition of this term. It receives it first significant 
discussion on page 14, where they quote familiar definitions by John 
Watkins and Jon Elster. But the authors acknowledge neither the 
ambiguities in these quoted definitions, nor the hugely varied uses of the 
term by its exponents. They thus resume a well-defined target, whereas 
in reality there are multiple usages of the term. Sometimes, for example, 
‘methodological individualism’ is wrongly treated in the literature as an 
ontological statement, e.g. ‘society consists of individuals’. Furthermore, 
Schumpeter’s (1908) original definition of the term profoundly contrasts 
with typical uses today (Hodgson 2007). 
I argue elsewhere (Hodgson 2007) that a crucial ambiguity in several 
definitions (including those provided by Elster and Watkins), is whether 
methodological individualism means that all social phenomena should be 
explained (i) in terms of individuals alone, or (ii) in terms of individuals 
plus interactive relations between individuals. I further argue that (i) is 
impossible in practice and no social phenomenon has been explained in 
terms of individuals alone. By contrast, in my view there is nothing wrong 
with the content of (ii), but it amounts to bringing social structures 
alongside individuals into the explanation, and thus does not warrant the 
description of methodological individualism. 
Fine and Milonakis are aware of my 2007 article on methodological 
individualism and they cite it without criticism. Fine and Milonakis (2009, 
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p. 21) also cite Kenneth Arrow’s (1994) important ‘rejection of 
methodological individualism within economics on the grounds that it 
cannot be realised in practice.’ According to Milonakis and Fine (2009, p. 
328), Hodgson (2007) ‘has questioned whether a pure form of 
methodological individualism is to be found in practice, let alone that it is 
possible giving the necessity of taking something social as given in the 
first instance’. Yet if my argument is right, then ‘something social’ is 
never actually excluded, even from the most blinkered or formal of 
economic analysis. Arrow (1994) reaches a similar conclusion. 
To put it straightforwardly, is post-1870s economics infused by 
‘methodological individualism’ or is it not? Like others, our authors 
repeatedly suggest that it is.7 But Fine and Milonakis also seem to 
concede the arguments of Arrow (1994) and myself that ‘methodological 
individualism’ is never found in ‘a pure form … in practice’ because of 
‘the necessity of taking something social as given in the first instance’. 
By citing Arrow and myself (significantly without any criticism or rebuttal), 
our authors seem to accept that the ‘pure’ form of methodological 
individualism (invoking explanations in terms of individuals alone) is 
impossible. 
This is such a major concession that it would imply that adequate 
explanations of social phenomena must always and unavoidably be in 
terms of both individuals and ‘something social’. This would be such an 
                                                 
7 See Milonakis and Fine (2009, pp. 5, 13-14, 45, 102-7, 110, 194, 199, 
202, 213, 239, 246-7, 251, 258, 260-1, 264, 268, 271, 294, 301, 310) 
and Fine and Milonakis (2009, pp. 8, 10, 24, 26, 31, 44, 58, 63, 67, 79, 
81, 96, 107, 120, 127, 134, 143, 145, 147). 
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elongated version of methodological individualism that it would be 
unworthy of the name (Hodgson 2007). Because both social and 
individual elements are necessary explanatory factors, the 
‘methodological individualism’ label is biased and misleading.  
So in their repeated statements that post-marginalist economics is 
driven by methodological individualism do they mean the ‘pure’ or the 
‘impure’ form? There is a fateful lack of clarity on this issue. 
Consequently, their proposition that the adoption of methodological 
individualism is problematic for modern economics lacks analytical bite. 
A further result of their apparent concession to Arrow (1994) and 
myself (that explanations are never in terms of individuals alone and 
must involve ‘something social’) is to undermine another central claim of 
the two books – that economics has allegedly narrowed itself to the point 
of excluding ‘social’ factors.  
It is highly significant that Fine and Milonakis never clearly define what 
they mean by ‘social’. I assume this includes all forms of causally 
interactive relations between individuals (namely social structures, 
institutions, organisations, positions, conventions and so on), plus 
emergent properties of these interactive relations (such as social 
culture), plus significant groupings of individuals (such as social classes). 
Arguably, in its treatment of such ‘social’ phenomena, modern 
mainstream economics is gravely impoverished. But this does not mean 
that social factors are (or can be) entirely excluded. In their concessions 
to Arrow and me our authors seem to accept this. Social or institutional 
factors may be covert but they are never absent from mainstream 
analysis. One of the most persistent themes in both historical school and 
original institutionalist writings is to show that property, markets, prices 
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and other factors – which are central to neoclassical economics – 
themselves require specific institutional and cultural foundations. One 
has only to dip into the works of Gustav Schmoller, Werner Sombart, 
Max Weber, or John Commons to find such arguments. More recently, 
Jan Kregel (1998) has shown that the general equilibrium model of Léon 
Walras assumed quite specific institutional foundations. And social 
structures (or relations) are central to modern game theory, even if they 
are not described as such. These accounts do not point to the absence 
of such factors, but to their covertness and implicitness. 
One is left wondering precisely what the reintroduction of the ‘social’ 
into economics might mean. In some disfigured and inadequate form, 
isn’t it there already? 
Hence the claim that the ‘marginalist revolution’ led to ‘detaching the 
market/economy from society’ (Fine and Milonakis 2009, p. 8) cannot be 
taken literally (even if we make the necessary correction of inserting ‘in 
theory’ after ‘detaching’). It is one thing to say that marginalists tried to 
sever such a link, quite another to say that they succeeded in analysing 
markets apart from social phenomena. In fact, neither is true. Although 
several early marginalists saw the economy and markets as facets or 
sectors of society as a whole, there is no evidence that they tried to rid 
analysis of the economy or markets of structured interactions between 
individuals. In the case of Walras (but less so for Marshall) markets and 
exchange were conceived in an overly abstract form. But ‘social’ 
elements remained in all these accounts. The economy was generally 
seen as part of society, not as apart from it. In any case, to separate the 
two would be theoretically impossible. 
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Consequently the severe problem in modern economics to which Fine 
and Milonakis allude (but do not clearly identify) is not the exclusion of 
the social, but the highly impoverished manner by which relational, 
structural, institutional, organisational and indeed moral factors are 
treated throughout most discourse in the discipline. ‘Social’ factors are 
always there in some form, but the individual building blocks are 
celebrated and adorned, rather than the humble but vital cement that 
helps to hold them together. 
As a result, claims (a) and (c) are at best misleading and at worst 
invalid.  
4. More central claims dissected – markets and neoclassical 
economics 
I now turn to claims (f) and (g), which allege that economics after the 
‘marginalist revolution’ became defined more narrowly as ‘the science of 
the market economy’ (Fine and Milonakis 2009, p. 22), and that the 
apparently contrary excursions of modern economists (such as Becker) 
onto ‘social’ terrain amount to treating ‘social’ phenomena as if they were 
markets. 
In the two volumes there is very little evidence to support these two 
claims. In fact, neither Walras, Menger, Jevons, Edgeworth, Marshall nor 
Robbins defined economics (or political economy) as ‘the science of the 
market economy’, or anything like that. 
Marshall, (1949, p. 1) for instance, defines economics as ‘the study of 
mankind in the ordinary business of life’. Economics ‘examines that part 
of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the 
attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing.’ This 
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conception includes industrial organisation, production and consumption, 
as well as exchange. Marshall’s writings were not confined to markets 
alone – they contain significant discussions of organisation, production 
and consumption. 
In part the problem here is that Fine and Milonakis offer no clear 
definitions of ‘the market’ or ‘the market economy’. So when we consider 
Walras’s (1874) universalisation of the concept of exchange to cover 
many forms of human interaction, even before the existence of legally 
sanctioned property rights, then is this the study of ‘the market economy’ 
or not? If Fine and Milonakis were to say that it was, then they would be 
culpable of universalising the concept of a market in a manner that they 
rightly criticise. But if they were to deny it, then they would have to 
acknowledge that Walras did not define economics as the study of the 
market economy. 
It is even more absurd to claim that Robbins defined economics as ‘the 
science of the market economy’. Robbins’s actual definition of 
economics is very important because it inspired Paul Samuelson (1948) 
and became increasingly influential after the Second World War.8 It is 
well known that Robbins defined economics as ‘the science of choice’. 
Fine and Milonakis deal with this by arguing that what is really behind 
this definition is choice à la marché. They seem to suggest that when 
Robbins says that economics applies to all choice involving scarcity, in 
fact he means only choice on the market.  
                                                 
8 See Backhouse and Medema (2009) on how the Robbins definition 
gradually spread through the discipline.  
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This interpretation would not only be odd, but manifestly false, because 
Robbins actually rebuts such a definition. In the first chapter of his 
Essay, Robbins (1932) considers several different definitions of the 
discipline. He notes that the then most popular definition, common to 
Edwin Cannan, John Bates Clark, Alfred Marshall and Vilfredo Pareto, 
was that economics is ‘the study of the causes of material welfare’ (p. 4). 
Robbins (1932, p. 17) goes on to consider an alternative definition, which 
he attributes in part to Alfred Ammon (1927), that economics is 
concerned with ‘the behaviour implied by the institutions of the 
Individualist Exchange Economy’. Robbins responds by arguing that 
while economists have a central interest in the analysis of exchange 
economies, this is mainly because so many individual choices are 
involved. There is no reason, Robbins (1932, pp. 19-20) argues, why 
economics should be confined to the study of market economies. 
Fine and Milonakis propose that when neoclassical economists apply 
their theories to non-market phenomena – such as the family – they are 
essentially treating those phenomena as if they were markets. Again this 
is at best a half-truth. Neoclassical economics does not adequately 
identify the nature of market decisions and relations. It is wrong to 
suggest that neoclassical economists have an adequate conception of 
markets and how they work. In fact, serious definitions and institutional 
analyses of the market are relatively rare, as Nobel Laureates George 
Stigler (1967, p. 291), Douglass North (1977, p. 710) and Ronald Coase 
(1988, p. 7) have all pointed out (Hodgson 2008a). Neither do Fine and 
Milonakis adequately explain the differences between individual 
decision-making and interaction inside and outside the market. 
Neoclassical economics is about consistent choices and their 
outcomes. It is not specifically about markets, at least in a rich, 
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institutional sense. Adequate concepts of property, contract, exchange 
and market are absent from standard neoclassical theory (Sened 1997, 
Hodgson 2001, 2009, Steiger 2008).  
For example, as a representative neoclassical economist, Armen 
Alchian (1977, 238) defines the property rights of a person in the 
universal terms of ‘the probability that his decision about demarcated 
uses of the resource will determine the use.’ The upshot of this definition 
is that if a thief manages to keep stolen goods then he acquires a 
substantial property right in them. Such ahistorical definitions of property 
neglect the essential concept of rightful ownership and make no 
distinction between de jure property and de facto possession (Hodgson 
2001, 2009, Steiger 2008). 
When attempts are made to discuss exchanges and markets in 
neoclassical economics, then the main element of the narrative is the 
increases of utility received by the individuals involved, not the transfer of 
property rights within a framework of legal institutions. When institutions 
appear they are discussed primarily in terms of the incentives, 
information and constraints that they provide for utility-maximizing 
individuals.  
The fact that neoclassical economists frequently use the word ‘market’ 
does not mean that they are employing the concepts of property, 
exchange and market in an adequate or precise way. When Becker 
(1976, p. 206) wrote that ‘a market for marriages can be presumed to 
exist’, markets are little more than a means by which agents can transact 
in some vague manner, to increase their mutual utility. When he uses the 
word ‘market’ it has little institutional substance other than a zone of 
interaction of individuals with their goods or capacities. 
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 Precisely because his concepts are so impoverished, Becker fails to 
make an adequate distinction between (a) sex traded intentionally for 
money or commodities, and (b) sex based on mutual agreement or 
desire rather than pecuniary or commodity exchange. Yet modern 
cultural (and religious) norms make a very strong differentiation between 
these two types of sexual relationship. Because he deploys no adequate 
notion of property, commodity exchange or market, these differences are 
elided in Becker’s analysis of the family. By reducing all transactions to 
the mutual enhancement of ‘utility’, neoclassical theory is generally 
heedless to the moral, cultural and institutional distinctions that are 
involved. 
It is thus highly misleading to suggest that neoclassical analysis has 
some kind of grounding in real markets, and that it is a mistake of the 
economics imperialists is to treat other social phenomena as if they were 
markets. Neoclassical theory has at best a tenuous relation to real 
markets, and hence it is largely unable to treat any social phenomenon in 
genuinely market terms. 
Before we leave markets I wish to make a final point. Although we are 
familiar with the singular phrase ‘the market’, and it is difficult to avoid it 
entirely, it is highly misleading. Once we acknowledge that markets are 
institutions then it is clear that there is not one market form, but several 
(Hodgson 1988, 2008a, Mirowski 2007). It is a defect of both 
neoclassical and Marxist economics to treat the market as a singular 
entity, and to underestimate its differences in form. Just as many 
mainstream economists see  ‘the market’ as an unambiguous benefit, 
most Marxists see it as an unambiguous burden. In fact there are many 
different kinds of market, with different possible outcome 
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5. Diagnosing sickonomics 
Fine and Milonakis pin much of the blame on the so-called ‘marginalist 
revolution’. I agree in part that marginalism helped to entrench notions of 
utility-maximisation, which in turn aided mathematical formalism. But the 
picture is more complicated because not all marginalists were wholly 
committed utilitarians. I also believe that the growth of marginalism and 
utilitarianism was much more gradual. 
This diagnosis contrasts with Tony Lawson (1997, 2006) who sees the 
problem with economics as inappropriate formalism. Because real world 
systems are open, there is a general mismatch between (inevitably 
closed) formal models and reality. If economics is to progress, then 
formal modelling must be limited to those cases where such regularities 
pertain, and these appear to be rather rare. Consequently, rather than 
the so-called ‘marginal revolution’ of the 1870s, Lawson would locate the 
full onset of the sickness of economics to the 1950s at the earliest, when 
mathematical approaches became much more prominent. For him, the 
principal battle between the heterodox and the mainstream is over the 
recognition of open systems and the limits of formalism.9 
                                                 
9 This would logically imply that prominent economists such as Ronald 
Coase, Friedrich Hayek and Richard Posner (whose work makes very 
little use of mathematics), many earlier economists such as Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, Carl Menger and Alfred Marshall (who used mathematics 
to a very limited extent, if at all), and perhaps others such as Milton 
Friedman and Paul Krugman (who have criticised the contemporary 
abuse of mathematical formalism in economics) should be regarded as 
 - 23 - 
Frederick Lee tells another very different story. Unlike Fine and 
Milonakis, Lee (2009, p. 26) believes that ‘neoclassical price theory 
objectively explained how … the capitalist market system … worked’ for 
capitalism circa 1900. The problem is that a different form of capitalism 
developed thereafter, and its analysis was best addressed not with the 
labour theory of value but with an amalgam of ideas including Gardiner 
Means’ theory of administered prices. Hence Lee (2009, p. 35) claims 
that ‘all the components were available in 1940 to create a relatively 
complete heterodox economic theory that could replace neoclassical 
theory.’ There are as many differences between these heterodox stances 
as there is between their work and neoclassical economics. But there is 
some communality between Lee, on the one hand, and Fine and 
Milonakis on the other. Both identify neoclassical price theory is the 
problem, but Lee credits it with some historical veracity.  
Fine and Milonakis are more radical. The principal policy conclusion 
that seems to flow from their analysis is that the salvation of economics 
lies in reversing the ‘marginalist revolution’. I doubt whether this is 
possible or desirable. The earlier classical and Marxist traditions are 
inadequate for our needs.10 Parts of marginalist analysis bring the 
benefit that they focus on incremental individual incentives, which are 
important matters both for theory and institutional design. I would prefer 
                                                                                                                                                        
heterodox rather than mainstream. Lawson acknowledges in print that 
Hayek is heterodox, but none of the others, as far as I am aware.  
10 Fine and Milonakis defend a version of the labour theory of value that 
is redolent of earlier formulations and debates and has lost little of the 
‘obscurantism’ that its critics identified decades ago (Fine and Harris 
1976, Hodgson 1977, Steedman 1977).  
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a strategy that placed Marshallian and other valuable insights within an 
institutional and historical context, as several American institutionalists 
attempted in the 1920s and 1930s (Hodgson 2004). 
How did economics become sick? Fine and Milonakis’ diagnosis of the 
causes of its malady is concentrated too much on the influence of ideas, 
and neglects the manner in which unsatisfactory notions are sustained 
and impelled by culture, institutions and vested interests. The battle of 
ideas is important, but in order to win, good generals also understand 
how people are guided and provisioned. 
I wish to sketch very briefly an alternative explanation of the sickness 
that afflicts economics. At the institutional and cultural level, the most 
important factor is the global change in the nature of the university. In 
developed countries before the Second World War, universities were 
reserved for rich (or intelligent and lucky) minorities. Despite some 
pressures from business and religious institutions, they often managed to 
dispense a liberal education and maintained an ethos for the pursuit of 
truth. But especially since the 1960s, the university has become an 
institution much more oriented to specialist professional training under 
the behest of business corporations. 
Veblen (1918) observed some of the early stages of this evolution long 
ago. Others, from different analytical and ideological viewpoints 
(Callahan 1962, Bloom 1988, Lutz and Field 1998, Kirp 2003, Greenberg 
2007) have charted within universities the postwar decline of broad and 
questioning inquiry, and the rise of narrower forms of professional 
training targeted for the needs of business. Students are less 
encouraged to pursue the big questions that haunt our existence. They 
are urged instead to acquire qualifications that signal skills that can be 
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hired on the jobs market. At the same time, professions have become 
increasingly more specialised (Rueschemeyer 1986, Pryor 1996). Ever-
deeper specialisation means that Renaissance-like figures with a 
capacity for an informed overview are both more difficult to create and 
even less likely to be acknowledged (Hodgson 1999). 
The postwar university expansion had the important benefit of bringing 
higher learning to a much wider segment of the population. Yet it was 
impelled by perceived economic needs, and the process of 
commercialisation within higher education was accelerated. Crucially, 
expanded education systems require much more from the public purse, 
and democratic and other pressures on governments oblige them to 
account for the expenditures in performance terms. There were demands 
that universities should serve the needs of the capitalist economy rather 
than pursue knowledge for its own sake.  
Together these forces eroded enclaves of broad liberal education, 
vastly expanded professional training oriented towards employment, led 
to requirements to account for the economic value of university research, 
and promoted the increasing use of league tables and formalised 
research assessments to pressure academics to publish their research.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
These background institutional forces have impacted upon different 
disciplines in different ways. Partly as a result of the recruitment of 
economists into operations research and other applications during the 
Second World War (Bernstein 2001, Mirowski 2002, Hodgson 2004), 
economics suffered in a peculiar way because it had established a type 
and degree of formalism that allowed research output to be assessed 
largely in terms of mathematical interest and elegance, with less heed to 
its philosophical or conceptual underpinnings. Economists were judged 
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and became employable for their aptitudes for statistical analysis or 
predictive models. 
Because they are no longer educated to take such issues seriously, 
many mainstream economists no longer care about the deeper 
meanings or historical origins of theories or concepts, or about big 
questions concerning economic and social systems. Economists learn 
‘tools’, but little of their ultimate purposes in the grand design. As long as 
academic economists publish in the higher-ranking economics journals 
dominated by mathematics, or land lucrative consultancy contracts, they 
reap their rewards and enhance their reputations.  
This process would be difficult or impossible to reverse, but undoing 
the marginal revolution would be no less tricky. What is necessary, at 
least for the near future, is for the technically unobsessed economists to 
establish networks and institutions in which broader modes of enquiry 
can be preserved. Much greater dialogue is required between economics 
and the other social sciences. Some reorganisation of the social 
sciences in universities is also necessary to help achieve this goal. 
Indeed, there is no apparent justification for the divisions between 
economics and ‘economic sociology’, or indeed sociology as a whole 
(Hodgson 2008b). 
6. Concluding remarks 
Mainstream economics will not be challenged effectively by imprecise 
discourse. Particularly in the works by Lee (2009) and Fine and 
Milonakis (2009, Milonakis and Fine, 2009), several key concepts such 
as ‘methodological individualism’ and ‘reductionism’ lack adequate 
definition. Fine and Milonakis wish to show how political economy lost its 
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soul to a narrow version of economics, bereft of ‘social’ or historical 
factors. Lee (2009, p. 7) similarly complains of the ‘ahistorical’ and 
‘asocial’ character of neoclassical economics. But one never learns the 
precise meaning of the ‘social’, and in any case this description of 
neoclassical economics is contestable. 
As an alternative to vaguely-defined ‘methodological individualism’ Fine 
and Milonakis propose an equally imprecise ‘methodological structurism’ 
(Fine and Milonakis 2009, pp. 149, 153-9). This amounts to a mélange of 
the work of Anthony Giddens and a few others, with no 
acknowledgement of some important criticisms of Giddens’ work, and 
without a mention of other significant recent important social theorists 
such as Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Pierre Bourdieu, Norbert Elias, 
Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann. 
There is nothing original in the history of economic ideas presented by 
Fine and Milonakis. There is no striking use of new sources and no major 
reinterpretation of known material. The authors repeat some discredited 
misinterpretations, particularly concerning Marshall and the ‘marginal 
revolution’, which have been shown in the light of scholarship to be 
flawed.11 
                                                 
11 On a minor point, the copyeditor of Fine and Milonakis (2009), fails to 
correct a grammatically grotesque habit of adding in-text Harvard-style 
references after a comma at the end of a sentence (rather than placing 
them entirely within brackets like this), thus undermining the structural 
integrity of the sentence as a whole. The copyeditor of Milonakis and 
Fine (2009) does a better job. 
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By contrast, Lawson’s account of the nature of heterodox economics is 
more rigorous and his work is conceptually more precise. But it offers 
little guidance on the way forward, save for the questionable project of 
building an economic analysis (of open systems) that is free of 
mathematics. 
Overall, there is much to complain about the state of modern 
mainstream economics, but the diagnoses and remedies offered by the 
authors discussed here are not only discordant, but also flawed and 
unconvincing.  
 - 29 - 
References 
 
Alchian, Armen A. (1977) ‘Some Implications of Recognition of Property 
Right Transaction Costs’, in Brunner, Karl (ed.) (1977) Economics and 
Social Institutions: Insights from the Conferences on Analysis and 
Ideology (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff), pp. 234-55. 
Amonn, Alfred (1927) Objekt und Grundbegriffe der theoretischen 
Nationalökonomie (Leipzig: Deutlicke). 
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1994) ‘Methodological Individualism and Social 
Knowledge’, American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 
84(2), May, pp. 1-9. 
Backhouse, Roger E. and Medema, Stephen G. (2009) ‘Defining 
Economics: The Long Road to Acceptance of the Robbins Definition’, 
Economica, 76, October, pp. 805-820. 
Becker, Gary S. (1976) The Economic Approach to Human Behavior 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
Becker, Gary S. (1981) A Treatise on the Family (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press). 
Bernstein, Michael A. (2001) A Perilous Progress: Economists and 
Public Purpose in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press). 
Black, R. D. C., Coats, A. W. and Goodwin, C. (eds) (1973) The Marginal 
Revolution in Economics (Durham: Duke University Press). 
Blaug, Mark (1997) ‘Ugly Currents in Modern Economics’, Options 
Politiques, 18(17), September, pp. 3-8. Reprinted in Mäki, Uskali (ed.) 
 - 30 - 
(2002) Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social 
Construction (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press). 
Bloom, Allan (1988) The Closing of the American Mind (New York: 
Simon and Schuster). 
Burns, Arthur Edward (1950) Review of Theories of Welfare Economics 
by Hla Myint, in American Economic Review, 40(3), June, pp. 422-4. 
Callahan, R. E. (1962) Education and the Cult of Efficiency (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press). 
Coase, Ronald H. (1988) The Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press). 
Colander, David C. (2005) ‘The Making of an Economist Redux’, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 19(1), Winter, pp. 175-98. 
Colander, David C. (2009) The Making of a European Economist 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). 
Colander, David C., Holt, Richard P. F. and Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr. (2004) 
The Changing Face of Economics: Interviews with Cutting Edge 
Economists (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press). 
Cunningham, William (1887) Political Economy Treated as an Empirical 
Science: A Syllabus of Lectures (Cambridge). 
Davis, John B. (2006) ‘The Turn in Economics: Neoclassical Dominance 
to Mainstream Pluralism?’ Journal of Institutional Economics, 2(1), 
April, pp. 1-20. 
Ekelund, Robert B. Jr. and Hébert, Robert F. (2002) ‘The Origins of 
Neoclassical Economics’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 
Summer, pp. 197-215. 
 - 31 - 
Fine, Ben and Harris, Laurence (1976) ‘Controversial Issues in Marxist 
Economic Theory’, Socialist Register, 1976, pp. 141-78. 
Fine, Ben and Milonakis, Dimitris (2009) From Economics Imperialism to 
Freakonomics: The Shifting Boundaries Between Economics and 
Other Social Sciences (London and New York: Routledge). 
Friedman, Milton (1950) ‘Wesley C. Mitchell as an Economic Theorist’, 
Journal of Political Economy, 58(6), December, pp. 465-93.  
Friedman, Milton (1999) ‘Conversation with Milton Friedman’, in Brian 
Snowdon and Howard Vane (eds), Conversations with Leading 
Economists: Interpreting Modern Macroeconomists (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar), pp. 122-44. 
Greenberg, Daniel S. (2007) Science for Sale: The Perils, Rewards, and 
Delusions of Campus Capitalism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press). 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (1977) ‘Papering Over the Cracks: Comments on 
Fine and Harris’ Survey of the Current Controversy within Marxist 
Economics’, Socialist Register, 1977, pp. 88-105. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (1988) Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto 
for a Modern Institutional Economics (Cambridge and Philadelphia: 
Polity Press and University of Pennsylvania Press). 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2001) How Economics Forgot History: The 
Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science (London and New 
York: Routledge). 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2004) The Evolution of Institutional Economics: 
Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American Institutionalism (London 
and New York: Routledge). 
 - 32 - 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2005) ‘Alfred Marshall versus the Historical 
School?’ Journal of Economic Studies, 32(4), 2005, pp. 331-48. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2007) ‘Meanings of Methodological 
Individualism’, Journal of Economic Methodology 14(2), June, pp. 211-
26. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2008a) ‘Markets’, New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics, second edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2008b) ‘Prospects for Economic Sociology’, 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 38(1), March, pp. 133-49. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2009) ‘On the Institutional Foundations of Law: 
The Insufficiency of Custom and Private Ordering’, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 43(1), March, pp. 143-66. 
Howey, Ralph S. (1960) The Rise of the Marginal Utility School 
(Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press). 
Kirp, David L. (2003) Shakespeare, Einstein, and the Bottom Line: The 
Marketing of Higher Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press). 
Koopmans, Tjalling C. (1947) ‘Measurement Without Theory’, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 29(3), August, pp. 161-72. 
Kregel, Jan A. (1998) ‘Financial Markets and Economic Development: 
Myth and Institutional Reality’, in Nielsen, Klaus and Johnson, Björn 
(eds) (1998) Institutions and Economic Change: New Perspectives on 
Markets, Firms and Technology (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 243-
57. 
Lawson, Tony (1997) Economics and Reality (London and New York: 
Routledge). 
 - 33 - 
Lawson, Tony (2006) ‘The Nature of Heterodox Economics’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 30(4), July, pp. 483-505. 
Lee, Frederick S. (2009) A History of Heterodox Economics: Challenging 
the Mainstream in the Twentieth Century (London and New York: 
Routledge).  
Lutz, Frank W. and Field, Robert W. (1998) Business Valuing in 
Academia: The American University as a Center for Profit or Inquiry? 
Higher Education, 36(4), December, pp. 383-419. 
Marshall, Alfred (1949) The Principles of Economics, 8th edn. (1st edn. 
1890) (London: Macmillan). 
Milonakis, Dimitris and Fine, Ben (2009) From Political Economy to 
Economics: Method, the Social and the Historical in the Evolution of 
Economic Theory (London and New York: Routledge). 
Mirowski, Philip (2002) Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg 
Science (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press). 
Mirowski, Philip (2007) ‘Markets Come to Bits: Evolution, Computation 
and Markomata in Economic Science’, Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, 63(2) June, pp. 209-42. 
Mitchell, Wesley C. (1927) Business Cycles: The Problem and its Setting 
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research). 
Mitchell, Wesley C. (1969) Types of Economic Theory: From 
Mercantilism to Institutionalism, 2 vols., ed. J. Dorfman (New York: 
Augustus Kelley). 
North, Douglass C. (1977) ‘Markets and Other Allocation Systems in 
History: The Challenge of Karl Polanyi’, Journal of European Economic 
History, 6(3), Winter, pp. 703-16.  
 - 34 - 
Pryor, Frederic L. (1996) Economic Evolution and Structure: The Impact 
of Complexity on the U.S. Economic System (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press). 
Robbins, Lionel (1932) An Essay on the Nature and Significance of 
Economic Science, 1st edn. (London: Macmillan). 
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (1986) Power and the Division of Labor 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
Samuelson, Paul A. (1948) Economics, 1st edn. (New York: McGraw-
Hill). 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1908) Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der 
theoretischen Nationalökonomie (München und Leipzig: Duncker und 
Humblot). 
Sened, Itai (1997) The Political Institution of Private Property 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Sombart, Werner (1930) Die drei Nationalökonomien: Geschichte und 
System der Lehre von der Wirtschaft (München und Leipzig: Duncker 
und Humblot). 
Steedman, Ian (1977) Marx After Sraffa (London: NLB). 
Steiger, Otto (ed.) (2008) Property Economics: Property Rights, 
Creditor’s Money and the Foundations of the Economy (Marburg: 
Metropolis).  
Stigler, George J. (1967) ‘Imperfections in the Capital Market’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 75(3), June, pp. 287-92. 
Veblen, Thorstein B. (1892) ‘The Price of Wheat since 1867’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 1(1), December, pp. 68-103. 
 - 35 - 
Veblen, Thorstein B. (1893) ‘The Food Supply and the Price of Wheat’, 
Journal of Political Economy, 1(3), June, pp. 365-79. 
Veblen, Thorstein B. (1905) ‘Credit and Prices’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 13(3), June, pp. 460-72. 
Veblen, Thorstein B. (1918) The Higher Learning in America: A 
Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men (New 
York: Huebsch). 
Walras, Léon (1874) Éléments d'économie politique pure, ou théorie de 
la richesse sociale (Lausanne : Rouge). 
Whitaker, John K. (ed.) (1996) The Correspondence of Alfred Marshall, 3 
vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
